Subject: [saag] BOFs about IoT firmware update and TEE configuration

From: Hannes Tschofenig <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 12:51:42 +0100

Hi all,

we have proposed two security-relevant BOFs for the upcoming meeting.
They are listed on the BOF Wiki page at
https://trac.tools.ietf.org/bof/trac/wiki but I still wanted to briefly
introduce them to you

** “Firmware Update Description (FUD)”

Last year we had a workshop organized by the IAB on firmware updates for
IoT devices (see https://www.iab.org/activities/workshops/iotsu/) where
we talked about various challenges and gaps.

As a follow-up to the workshop we would like to initiate some
standardization activity in this area.

The mailing list can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/fud

** “A Protocol for Dynamic Trusted Execution Environment Enablement (TEEP)”

This BOF is about an application layer security protocol that allows to
configure security credentials and software running on a Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE). Today, TEEs are, for example, found home
routers, set-top boxes, smart phones, tablets, wearables, etc.
Unfortunately, there have been mostly proprietary protocols used in this
environment.

With this BOF we are making an attempt to standardize such a protocol. A
strawman proposal of such a protocol has been published with
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pei-opentrustprotocol-03.

The mailing list can be found at:
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/teep

Ciao
Hannes

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From: Eliot Lear <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 14:29:20 +0100

Hannes,

Can you say a few words about how TEE compares to
draft-ietf-anima-bootstrap-keyinfra (et al) which has been in
development in a WG for quite some time?

Eliot

On 2/13/17 12:51 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> _______________________________________________
> saag mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag

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From: Michael Richardson <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 11:26:23 -0500

> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/fud

It's a terrible TLA. Too good not to keep.

    > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/teep

okay.
We (ANIMA bootstrap DT) need BOF time to talk about what we are doing, and how
we leverage TPMs.  This is additional existing work.

--
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect  [
]     [email-masked]  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [

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From: Hannes Tschofenig <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2017 17:17:12 +0100

Hi Eliot,

I actually don't know since I never understood the ANIMA work all that
well due to its fuzzy scope. I suspect that you can answer the question
better than I do.

Ciao
Hannes

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From: Eliot Lear <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2017 15:58:04 +0100

Hi Hannes,

First, Max, Michael, Michael, and Kent are far more the experts than I
am on this, but here is a brief summary:

The purpose of  draft-ietf-anima-bootstrap-keyinfra is to provide a
trusted introduction between devices and the network such that you start
in the following state:

Device has a manufacturer certificate (802.1AR iDevID) and a
manufacturer trust root, and the local network can in some way
authenticate the manufacturer, and perhaps visa versa.  The end state is
that the device has a local (802.1 LDevID) and a local trust anchor.  To
accomplish this, a flow is defined to get to the point where the device
will register with a local registrar using EST (either EST or EST/CoAP).

Now perhaps you could explain a little about the TEE draft you're doing?

If there's some overlap perhaps there's a chance to consolidate the work.

Eliot

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From: Hannes Tschofenig <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2017 09:15:51 +0100

Hi Eliot,

(I put the TEEP mailing list on CC since they may be interested in this
conversation as well.)

The use case for TEEP is a bit different.

The idea is to configure software running on a trusted execution
environment. While the currently proposed solution assumes a PKI and the
use of asymmetric key cryptography it does not use 802.1AR certificates.
There is no notion of a local network since it does not matter. The
document also does not talk about how the messages are conveyed but HTTP
is more likely for the smart phone/tablet use cases.

I created a slide deck for presentation at the T2TRG meeting at the
Berlin IETF but unfortunately there was no time. Nevertheless, here is
the slide deck:
https://github.com/t2trg/2016-ietf96/blob/master/slides/70_OTrP-IETF93.pdf

Does this provide enough information about the intention?

Ciao
Hannes

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From: Eliot Lear <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2017 09:33:14 +0100

Great start, thanks!  Will contact you offline to further discuss.

Eliot