Subject: [saag] AD sponsoring Effect of Ubiquitous Encryption

From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2017 16:13:46 +0000

Hiya,

Al and Kathleen have asked me to AD sponsor this
draft. [1] I think we mentioned this a couple of
times at IETF meetings and on this list.

I plan to do my AD review of this shortly and then
start an IETF last call. If you have comments in
the meantime please do send them here.

If you're willing to be document shepherd for this
one please send me an offlist email in the next
day or two.

Thanks,
S.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mm-wg-effect-encrypt-04

---

From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 22 Jan 2017 20:42:11 +0000

Hi again,

First, thanks to Paul Hoffman for being willing to be the
document shepherd for this. And to the authors for what
will be a fine RFC when it's done.

Second, I've done my AD review of this and there are a set
of things that need fixing before we'll be ready for IETF
last call. At minimum there are still a few placeholder
sections of text (2.3,2.3.1,3.2,2), but I also have many
comments that cumulatively raise to the level where we
should address a bunch of those before IETF LC, even
though many (but not all) of my comments are relatively
nitty. I think that almost all of those should be pretty
easy to resolve, so we should still be able to get this
done before IETF98 I hope.

My AD review is below.

Cheers,
S.

general: I wonder if we're dealing with all possible effects
or only with those relevant to network management, security
ad privacy? For example, more encryption does prevent some
advertising insertion, but whether or not that is in scope
here is unclear to me. Should it be?

- title: I wonder would "Effects of Much More Common
Encryption" be a better title? Ubiquitous is never actually
going to happen, nor is it required for many of the effects
to be seen. (And there is defo. >1 effect to be seen.) Or,
you could keep the title, but explain in the text that you
really mean "much more common."

- abstract: "solve these problems" is a tad one-sided in that
it doesn't recognise the valid reasons for more
confidentiality. I think it's important that the abstract
recognise that we're here documenting one set of consequences
of what is a valid set of trade-offs and not describing a set
of problems caused for no good reason.  I think that it's
important to set the right tone early for this one - if we
don't then some readers who want better privacy may be more
likely to be dismissive, which'd be a shame.

- abstract: "will impact" is maybe no longer the correct
tense - we've seen some of these impacts already I think, so
maybe "are impacting" or just "impact" is better?

- abstract: "more drastic" seems unfounded - what do you
really want to say there?

- intro: I'm not sure "primarily a passive attack" is right.
Maybe easiest to just delete that clause as I don't think
it's needed here. You could add a reference to RFC7624 for
those who'd like more detail.

- intro, 2nd para: I'm not sure what you mean referring to
"many attackers"? That sentence doesn't seem to make sense
as-is.

- intro: the UTA document references need to be updated

- intro: the 30% figure is probably out of date, please check
again (or add a date as done with the others).

- intro: "for corporate users" would be better removed - we
care as much about non-corporate users after all

- intro: "TLS over HTTP" is backwards, as is "TLS over XMPP"

- intro: "Although this does provide..." - that sentence
isn't right, passive is not the opposite of e2e, I think you
want s/passive wiretapping/transport layer attacks/

- intro: You mention OTR, but the cooler kids these days use
signal/telegram (though I don't for platform reasons;-).
Might be worth checking out what to say about those, or just
say "e.g. OTR" instead of making it seem like OTR is the only
way to do IM e2e.

- intro, 2nd last para: that one is very good

- intro, last para: you don't mention enterprise networks
here, worth a mention?

- section 2, 2nd para: I think you could do with a forward
reference or example to the "opterational practices that
require cleartext" or maybe better is to s/require/previously
depended on/

- 2: "TLS over SMTP" - backwards again

- 2: "The EFF reported..." that needs a reference

- 2: I'm not at all sure encryption "prevents" load
balancing, in fact I'm pretty sure it does not prevent that

- 2: "on the decline now that they are exposed through the
media" - I think it'd be better to remove that sentence - it
doesn't add much and there are more details better described
later I'm sure.

- 2.1: this sections seems mixed between middleboxes and
mobile, probably as a result of iterative editing. Not sure
how best to fix.

- 2.1, last para: Is that really a middlebox function? I
thought most of the examples given were cases of end systems
(web servers) impinging on privacy and not middleboxes (and
the naughty web servers are not affected by encryption so
aren't really in scope)

- 2.1.3: I don't think DPI aims to improve "features and
efficiency"

- 2.1.3: "must be known" is overstated - again I think we
want to always phrase it as "has previously been assumed to
be required" or similar

- 2.1.4: I think compression could (and maybe should) be
separated out - one of the things CRIME has shown us is that
we had more to learn about how to combine compression and
encryption. I also think most compression is not done/undone
at middleboxes, nor does it relate to monitoring so
compression doesn't seem to fit well in 2.1. (Transcoding
however might fit in some middlebox section, but is not
compression.)

- 2.1.5: s/law agencies/law enforcement agencies/ is the
usual term, and LEAs are not the only entities that insist on
this kind of thing - considering censorship.

- 2.1.5: "sites promoting anorexia" seems like an odd
example, but I think in any case it'd be better to generalise
the examples a bit

- 2.1.5: DNS queries do not "reveal" URLs. And the described
mechanism seems quite odd.

- 2.1.5: The 3rd last para about  "TLS proxies" and "future
versions of HTTP and TCP" is not clear to me. Is that really
needed?

- 2.1.5: Parental controls might deserve it's own subsection
- it differs in that the endopints are involved, which I
think means that the effects of e.g. TLS on the changes
required to the service are different from cases where an
external party (govt/SP/whoever) imposes the filtering.

- 2.1.6.3: I think you need a reference to RFC2804 here. The
IETF does not to LI in standards, for the (good) reasons
stated therin. So this may be a case where the effects of
crypto do enhance existing IETF policy but also counter
existing policies of other entities. But we should not ignore
the former (IETF) policy - we ought not claim here that one
or the other are better, but just ack the tussle.

- 2.1.6.4: MTAs do trypically have cleartext access, so what
kind of spam/malware filtering do you mean there?  How does
that relate to the mail architecture? (There's an RFC for
that that ought be ref'd.) If section 5 does cover this well,
then I'd say removing this section would be good as it add
nothing much that I can see.

- 2.2: Do we have evidence that the decrease of measurement
accuracy has actually lead to a decrease in repair
efficiency? I'm not convinced - it doesn't seem like a crazy
proposition, but nor does it seem like a tautology. (What
metric for efficiency of repair is there that could be mapped
to visibility of different protocol layers?)

- 2.2, 2nd para: This is repetitive. Making the point once is
enough.

- 2.3 and 2.3.1: What is the intent here? These sections seem
to be content free. Looks like a placeholder that never got
filled in? (Not unreasonable as it's hard to see real
downsides to encryption of inter-DC traffic.) These need to
be fixed or deleted. Probably deleted is better. (Certainly
easier.) That needs fixing before IETF LC.

3.1.1, 1st para: I'm not clear how session monitoring of
cleartext is needed for SLA evaluation. Maybe an example of
some specific thing needed would helpa but I'm not seeing an
input to SLA evaluation here. (I do see how logs can be
useful there.)

3.1.1 (and elsewhere): s/mobile clients/clients/ - while some
of thie text relates to the marnew w/s, it ought only specify
mobile clients where those are specifically relevant, an in
this case, and others, they're not.

3.1.2: "cyber-security" and "cyber-attack" please avoid
thosse ill-defined marketing terms unless you really need and
can justify them

3.1.1: Is "malware explosion" a generally known term? I think
detection is sufficient and searing for "malware explosion"
doesn't turn up what I think you mean. (I'm guessing you mean
unzipping etc.)

3.1.2, last para: I'm not clear how this para fits here or in
this document in general. Not sure if that's just me or if
some better linkage is needed, or even if the text would be
better moved or deleted.

3.2.1: I'm not sure I agree with this, at least as stated.
Wouldn't passive monitoring of ciphertext be just as
effective for the SLA metrics mentioned in almost all cases?

3.2.2: "[Need descriptions for..." The rest of that para
seems like placeholder text that needs fixing before IETF LC.

3.2.2: I think it'd be worth saying somewhere here that
STARTTLS ought have zero effect on anti-SPAM etc. for SMTP
traffic but is only an issue in corner-cases for e.g. hosters
who want to scan outbound port 25 traffic in case their
cusomters have suffered breaches and start sending spam.  (At
least that's my understanding.) PGP or S/MIME do of course.

3.2.2: What header encryption efforts are meant here? I'm not
familiar with anything doing exactly that. Or maybe it's just
a phrasing issue? Or perhaps this text is a bit old and OBE?
(I mean that initial hopes that we initiate work to to
encrypt e.g. Subject seem to be currently moribund.)

3.2.2: I'm not sure the bullet list here is a good idea.
E.g. it omits DKIM related things and SPF related things.
Maybe check with some anti-spam folks if keeping this list?

3.3: I wondered if this section would be better reorganised
into a structure based on where the keys are located. Not
sure but that might be a clearer way to distinguish the
various kinds of encrypted storage. (Feel free to ignore this
suggestion if it doesn't resonate.)

3.3.1: I found this sub-section confusing and not useful.
Would suggest simplifying it a lot.  The term "burst data"
isn't that clear.

- section 4: Is "for Enterprise Users" right here?

- 4: "harder to break" is not relevant here - at least in
terms of algorithms, which is what that'd be interpreted as
far as to mean. If you mean that non FS mechanisms (e.g. RSA
key transport) provide more opportunity for decryption at
places other than the endpoint at which the applications
calls for decryption, but that we increasingly do want to see
more use of FS mechanisns, and that that's a tension, then
maybe say that.

- 4.1: Not sure "static" is quire right - I think what you
mean is replicated TLS server RSA private keys.

- 4.1.1: "Enterprise users are subject to the policies of
their organization." That is jurisdiction-dependent - at
least in some countries (e.g. Ireland) the enterprise cannot
breach employment laws that can touch on employee privacy.
Such jurisdictional issues can work both ways of course,
either re-inforcing privacy or calling for privacy to be
eroded even more than the enterprise would wish.  Suggest
adding "... and the jurisdictions in which the enterprise
operates" to cover both;-)

- 4.1.1: "These functions are critical to security and fraud
monitoring." I don't accept that this is true of all the
numbered elements in the list.  Supposed countermeasures for
IP leakage for example are often ineffective (though vendors
who sell such things will doubtless disagree;-). I'd say
toning that down a bit would be right, e.g. s/are criticial/
are often consided important/.

- 4.1.2: Mention of PDM reminds me that that has had a pretty
thorough discussion related to the secdir review and issues
relevant to this draft. Incorporating a description of that
history would maybe be useful so that we have less pain when
we re-do that in future for other protocols.

- 4.1.3: I don't accept "impossible" is correct. If we wanted
to say that, we'd need evidence, e.g. via a set of
references. "More onerous" would be fine if that's all we
need to say. A number of other similar changes are needed for
the text in 4.1.3.x as well, e.g.:

- 4.1.3.1: "requires" is overstated, and what evidence is
there for "frequently used"? I don't accept either assertion
without evidence.

- 4.1.3.x: there are more of the above that need fixing

- 4.2, 2nd para: A lot of this is duplicative of earlier
text.

- 4.2: "unique and efficient vantage point" that's sales
language and doesn't belong here.

- 5.1: "TLS over SMTP" again a couple of times

- 5.2: Is I-D.teague.. the right reference here? I'd have
thought there was an ipfix RFC already that'd be good here.

- 5.6: "has quickly reacted to" is sales language and doesn't
belong.

- 5.6: What is "[not BCP84]" as a reference? And I'm not sure
why RFC2504 is a good reference here either. Are we talking
about BCP38 but someone forgot to update text written from
memory or something? :-)

- 5.6: SAVI was only chartered for enterprise networks iirc.

- 5.7: THe [SACM] reference is odd and has no entry in
section 12.

- 6.1: Are those "notable exceptions" still relevant? I'd say
maybe not.

- 6.1: Is the Alt-SVC description correct? I'm not sure. I
suggest you ask an HTTP person maybe. That could also do with
some references.

- 6.1: "... to be blocked" makes some assumptions about
what's ok/right that are not needed, "being requested" would
be better.

- section 7: "efforts to prevent it" - which it? And I don't
think prevent is what you mean, unless you're moving into the
"what the spooks want" territory and away from "what network
managers need" which'd seem out of scope.  I think that needs
rephrasing.

- section 7: "National surveillance programs" is not the
right phrase. Maybe just "Law enforcement agencies..."

- 7: please drop the various uses of "cyber" again;-)

- 7: David Cameron seems to no longer act in that role.

- 7: "avoid the fears of terrorism" is wrong - fears will
exiat and be propogated by various actors regardless. And
understanding technology won't help there. I think the fear
you mean is that technolgoy will be abused by bad actors.

- 7: The text seems to assume that all governments are
equally ok and that they all like one another equally. I dont
believe that is the case, so there are additional categories
of bad actor that are missing here. I also find the frequency
of the occurrence of "terror" to be higher than needed. (That
is a scare-word best omitted when not needed.)

- 7: I think a reference to the workshop held in Wash. DC
last year (maybe June?) on whether or not magic solutions for
LEAs can exist here may be useful. Some IETFers attended, and
it covered these issues in a lot more depth than could be
fitted here but I don't have the reference to hand. (Spoiler:
there is no magic;-)

- 7, last para; I'd recommend deleting this. When and if PIR
methods are usable they will create as many issues as the
solve, from the perspective of this document.

- section 11: Is this useful? If not, it ought be deleted.
If so, then it should be a section of its own on mobile
networks and not an appendix. (I'll comment assuming that
keeping the text is better, but I'm not sure it is, given the
amount of context it may need.)

- 11.1: What is an ACK stream? A reference or description is
needed. "Prevents" needs justification (possibly via
reference)

- 11.1: eNodeB needs a reference, KPI/KQI need expansion, CEM
needs describing or a reference. What is a "sector"?  And (in
this context) what is "a server"? APN needs a reference.

- 11.1: "trusted parties" is unclear - you need to say what
is trusted by whom for what actions for this to be useful.

- 11.1: DRM/QOE need expansion and a reference to justify the
claim wrt *maximising* QOE.

- 11.1: "Trusted proxy" - see above wrt term trusted. But in
this case, the term is misleading and ought not be used as
there seems to be no way in which the entity who needs to
trust the proxy can know that that proxy exists. Please drop
that term entirely. (Call it a TLS-MitM attacker if you must,
as that is what it is and that is how such things were
referred to earlier in this document.) There are two
occurrences of that misldeading marketing term to remove.

- 11.1: RAN needs expansion and "RAN-aware pacing" needs
explanation and/or reference.

- 11.2: What is meant here by "Transport header"? TCP mostly
doesn't have this issue, so I assume this is looking forward
to QUIC. I'd argue that if so, this text should be deleted as
we now have a WG for QUIC which is specifically chartered to
address these issues.  If this is not about QUIC, then please
elaborate.

- 11.2: ANDSF needs a reference

- 11.2: SON and MLB need references

- 11.2: UPCON needs a reference, off-peak acceleration and
outbound roamers need explanation and/or reference

- 11.2: DSCP needs a reference

- 11.3: RCS, QCI, LTE need rererences

- 11.3: eMBMS needs a reference, see above wrt "trusted"

- 11.3: Asserting that TLS is not necessary for DRM'd content
is arguable and not blatently true, as asserted here.

- 11.4: see above wrt "trusted."

- 11.4: QAM, CS-Voice need references

- 11.4: PGW, GGSN need references

- 11.4; "GW" needs explanation and/or a reference

- 11.4: "Decreasing Client-Server control loop requires
deploying CDNs/Cloud functions that terminate encryption
closer to the edge." I don't accept that "requires" is
clearly true. Please justify e.g. via reference. Or maybe
re-phrase so that the statement is clearly true but doesn't
have gigantic implications for who is allowed to deploy what.
(Or maybe I'm confused by what is meant here?)

- 11.4: s/de-encryt/decrypt/

- 11.4: MEC needs a reference, see above wrt "trusted proxy"

- 12.1: I agree with the shepherd that all the references
here can be informative and you don't need 2119.

- 12.2: URLs like that used for CAIDA aren't great for RFCs -
better to find a better reference where that's easy (which it
is in that case). I'm less sure about how best to deal with
the Intercept and EFF, but if you search in
scholar.google.com you may find other references for that
content that are easier to use. (The issue here being
reference stability.)

- 12.2: [homomophic] needs a better reference if it stays,
e.g. Gentry's PhD or something.

- 12.2: various references need to be updated. I-D nits will
help you there

- 12.2: I'm sure you'll agree that [TOR] isn't right as-is:-)

---

From: Kathleen Moriarty <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2017 14:33:27 -0500

Hi Stephen,

First, thank you for your detailed review, this is very helpful to
improve the document.  Al's on vacation, so I will respond in-line for
us and take the blame later if needed :-)

> will be a fine RFC when it's done.

Thank you, Paul!
> here is unclear to me. Should it be?

I'd constrain it a little further to what we and others contributed.
We certainly could have missed some items in network management,
operation, security and privacy.  I'll look at the introduction to see
if the text can make it more clear on what the document covers.

We encouraged the security and operator communities to contribute as
best we could.

> really mean "much more common."

Let me think on this a bit to see if I can come up with an another
title or we'll just note exactly what is meant in the introduction as
suggested.

> likely to be dismissive, which'd be a shame.

How about,
     "This draft seeks only to record the current state to assist in the
      development of alternate options to achieve the intended purpose of the
      documented practices.

> maybe "are impacting" or just "impact" is better?

I think just impacts works, thanks.

> really want to say there?

This is thinking from the operators perspective.  I do think this is
drastic for some and that we should recognize the large change in
their world.  Do you have another suggestion that conveys this
understanding?  Bringing both sides of this together is really the
goal.

> those who'd like more detail.

Sure there can be active attacks that lead to pervasive monitoring,
and I'm fine with that change.

> "many attackers"? That sentence doesn't seem to make sense

Thanks, I see what you mean.  The text isn't as straightforward as it
could be.  I think we were avoiding saying terrorists, but should just
said bad actors.

Old:
      Many attackers and those
      that pose a greater threat are already using strong encryption and tools
      like TOR <xref target="TOR"/> to prevent active attacks on their data
      streams
New:
      Bad actors, for example criminals or terrorists, could easily
employ the use of strong encryption with tools like TOR <xref
target="TOR"/> to prevent active attacks on their data streams, which
are possible with OS.

> - intro: the UTA document references need to be updated

Done, thanks.

> again (or add a date as done with the others).

Changed to spring 2015.  Will try to get a new figure if possible.

> care as much about non-corporate users after all

Hmm, this is referring to the statistic for encrypted content, which
was specific to corporate users. While we may care about non-corporate
users more, this is an easier statistic to get since they are behind a
firewall and corporate network used to gather this statistic.
Non-corporate users might result in a different statistic, so I'd
prefer to leave this as-is.

> - intro: "TLS over HTTP" is backwards, as is "TLS over XMPP"

Odd, thanks for catching this.

> want s/passive wiretapping/transport layer attacks/

Updated, thanks.
> say "e.g. OTR" instead of making it seem like OTR is the only

Hmm, signal seems to be for SMS on Andriod only...  or does it have a
wider reach?  If so, I'd rather not mention that.  Telegram seems to
be an app that relies on SMS and it's own messaging format, so it
doesn't provide encryption for XMPP.  If I add this, I'd have to add
other messaging apps as well.  I think it's fine to leave as-is with
standards mentioned only.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telegram_(software)

> - intro, 2nd last para: that one is very good

Thanks :-)  It's the goal of the draft.
> - intro, last para: you don't mention enterprise networks

*Hmm, let me think about that a bit and we can come back to this one.

> require cleartext" or maybe better is to s/require/previously

Took your suggested text, thanks.

> - 2: "TLS over SMTP" - backwards again

Odd. Fixed, thanks.
> - 2: "The EFF reported..." that needs a reference

added informative
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/11/starttls-downgrade-attacks
> balancing, in fact I'm pretty sure it does not prevent that

This was on the content.  Would you prefer to see it reworded/expanded?

> doesn't add much and there are more details better described

I cut out the first part, leaving the explanation...
> mobile, probably as a result of iterative editing. Not sure

Sure, the first part mixes multiple ways fingerprinting is used and
one is not middle boxes at all, but I'm not sure I want to separate
that out and make the document longer... but if needed we can.

*For the rest of the section, we are running into the many contributor
problem and it's not clear how to make this better, but I'll think
about it more.

> the naughty web servers are not affected by encryption so

*No, same as the last part of the subsection on fingerprint analysis.
We could remove it or break it out into another section.  If we break
it out into another section, the content may feel repetitive.
> - 2.1.3: I don't think DPI aims to improve "features and

That was an operator's perspective.  Somehow we need to have both a
security and operators perspective seen so we can help each other.
The sentence says they are augmented, not improved, is there really an
issue keeping this text?

> want to always phrase it as "has previously been assumed to

This was contributed text, so the functions they were performing, in
the way they were being performed, might require the the traffic type
to be known.  I agree the text around this does not make that clear. I
am hesitant to change the intended meaning without what seems like the
additional context needed.

How about, "has been required to date".  I'd really like to respect
the operators views and have them documented as they see it.

> however might fit in some middlebox section, but is not

OK, I see your perspective, but will try to shed light on the context
of this section.  This was contributed from GSMA.  They have been
using compression in this way and see a change in operations as a
result of the use of encryption on the wire. I believe it is used in
gateway situations from previous discussions.  The point in this
section is to note the practice and that encryption presents a problem
for this operational practice.  It's not suggesting encryption with
compression as a solution, rather saying that some operators may
resort to attempts to prevent/break encryption to allow for the
compression they see as necessary to deliver services.  It's going to
break/is breaking and this just acks that point.

> this kind of thing - considering censorship.

updated, thanks.
> example, but I think in any case it'd be better to generalise

Deleted that text.

> mechanism seems quite odd.

Sure, looks like some flowery language inaccurately describing what
was intended.  I changed it to the following:

          Although filtering can be
          done by many methods one common method occurs when a DNS lookup
          of a hostname in a URL which appears on a government or recognized
          block-list.

> versions of HTTP and TCP" is not clear to me. Is that really

Hmm, I'm guessing this was referring to TCPInc work, but I think
deleting the paragraph should be fine (scream now if you were the
contributor and disagree) since the text concludes with a statement
that this is not the case and has not been standardized.

> external party (govt/SP/whoever) imposes the filtering.

Done as a subsection of this section for now.  Thanks.

> or the other are better, but just ack the tussle.

Done, thanks.
> nothing much that I can see.

Deleted.
> to visibility of different protocol layers?)

*This is from Al (I believe), so I suspect it is backed up from
operational testing.

> - 2.2, 2nd para: This is repetitive. Making the point once is

Hmm, I deleted the last sentence, but think the example may be helpful
within the operator community.

> easier.) That needs fixing before IETF LC.

Yes, deleted.

> input to SLA evaluation here. (I do see how logs can be

I can't figure it out either, but changed the text to:

          The use of session encryption to access hosted
          environments limits access restrictions to the metadata
described below.

It goes on to describe 2-tuples and 5-tuples below.

> this case, and others, they're not.

Done here and I'll have to look elsewhere as well.

> thosse ill-defined marketing terms unless you really need and

Agreed, changed to security.

> doesn't turn up what I think you mean. (I'm guessing you mean

That may be what was meant, but I just deleted explosion for now.  I
think this came from Nalini and it must have slipped through my edit
pass & Al's.  If something else was intended here that is important,
she can chime in.

> some better linkage is needed, or even if the text would be

*Hmm, I see how this relates to SPs, but not to this subsection.  I'm
not sure of the contributor as it may be tied to application content,
but you are right - this text doesn't flow and that is not clear from
the paragraph,

> effective for the SLA metrics mentioned in almost all cases?

Hmm, so I'm trying to decipher the text as well.  What I can surmise
is that the impediments to performance and availability are the
"interferences".  Some things that interfere with traffic might be
seen outside of 2-tuples and 5-tuples more easily.  For the metrics
themselves, I agree with you.  However, they may know the cause of the
"interference"  with visibility into the traffic.

Perhaps adding the sentence:

          "The actual SLA metrics may not be effected by
          encryption, however visibility of interferences may be limited."

> seems like placeholder text that needs fixing before IETF LC.

deleted this paragraph.  The rest flowed well enough and this was a
placeholder for contributions.
> least that's my understanding.) PGP or S/MIME do of course.

OK, consider yourself the contributor for the above removed paragraph.
I edited the above slightly.

> encrypt e.g. Subject seem to be currently moribund.)

This is old from the list that we started a while back on the topic
that I don't think went anywhere.  I'll delete it, but think we should
have something in there about some of the other efforts - just
mentioning dark mail and proprietary solutions.

> Maybe check with some anti-spam folks if keeping this list?

I removed the whole section as it didn't make sense without the email
header thing that has gone away...

> suggestion if it doesn't resonate.)

Yeah, it's more complicated than that as even on similar platforms,
the solutions can differ.  If KMIP is used, then you have a standard t
go off of, but that's not always the case.

> Would suggest simplifying it a lot.  The term "burst data"

Hmm, I removed the word burst, but essentially, you could have a burst
of data of a certain size and the size could dictate where the burst
of data is stored.  The same application might have some data stored
locally, then some off to an external service.  I reworded to remove
the word burst and explain it better.

> - section 4: Is "for Enterprise Users" right here?

No, it should probably just be enterprises. updating, thanks.

> more use of FS mechanisns, and that that's a tension, then

I agree with you and deleted that clause.  Later in the paragraph, I
changed "need" to "desire".

> mean is replicated TLS server RSA private keys.

Yes, updated.
> operates" to cover both;-)

Updated, thanks for the text.
> are often consided important/.

Hmm, in reading this contributed text, I would change it even more
than what you are suggesting.  The functions aren't critical to
monitoring, but rather detecting these functions are important to
effective monitoring and mitigation of malicious traffic that is not
limited to malware.  How about:

OLD:
          A significant portion of malware hides its activity within
          TLS or other encrypted protocols. This includes lateral movement,
          Command and Control, and Data Exfiltration. These functions are
          critical to security and fraud monitoring.
NEW:
          A significant portion of malware hides its activity within
          TLS or other encrypted protocols. This includes lateral movement,
          Command and Control, and Data Exfiltration. Detecting these
          functions are important to effective monitoring and mitigation of
          malicious traffic, not limited to malware.

> we re-do that in future for other protocols.

* Will have to go back to this as I'm not recalling this off hand and
will have to review the discussion.

> the text in 4.1.3.x as well, e.g.:

The problem here (IMO) is that vendors need to step up their logging
game.  Many of the errors could be seen if logs better identified
issues that I have been shown or that we've seen in presentations from
enterprise representatives in the IETF.  From their perspective, the
problem seems insurmountable as they don't know how they will contact
and so many vendors to increase logging and they no longer have
visibility into packet streams to detect even simple issues like
incorrect passwords..  I think we need to help (and are trying to do
so) in standards documentation calling for logging of errors.

The sentence is limited to finding things in network traces, so with
encryption, they are right... they need other methods like log
analysis.  We need to ack the problems in this draft, so how about
adding this sentence instead of changing the last one:

          Alternate methods, such as log analysis need
          improvement to fill this gap.
> there for "frequently used"? I don't accept either assertion

Hmm, my read of this part of the NAT section is that they use
identifier information to trace traffic, which is normal.  Up to this
point in the text, I am reading it in a way that they can do this
through logs.  I have more of an issue with the following paragraphs.
Requires just means that if they are going to follow a trace, they
need some identifiers to do so - 2-tuples, 5-tuples and how they
change (logs) through a device that performs NAT.

I propose changing this instead:
OLD:
            Combine this with the fact that users are often allocated
            randomly by load balancers to all these devices, the network
            troubleshooter is often left with no option in today's environment
            except to trace all packets at a particular layer, decrypt them
            all, and look at the payload to find a user session.</t>
NEW:
            Combine this with the fact that users are often allocated
            randomly by load balancers to all these devices, the network
            troubleshooter is often left with very few options in today's
            environment due to poor logging implementations in applications.
            As such, network troubleshooting is used to trace packets at a
            particular layer, decrypt them, and look at the payload to find a
            user session.</t>

and
OLD:
      Endpoints
      typically don't have the capacity to handle this level of network
      packet capture, so out-of-band networks of robust packet brokers and
      network sniffers that depend on static RSA private keys accomplish
      this task today.

NEW:

      Endpoints typically don't have the capacity to handle
      this level of network packet capture, so out-of-band networks of
      robust packet brokers and network sniffers that use techniques such
      as copies of TLS RSA private keys accomplish this task today.
> - 4.1.3.x: there are more of the above that need fixing

**Additional cleanup, but I'm making a leap that the logs for this are
inadequate, so this needs to be confirmed.
OLD:
            When TCP Pipelining/Session Multiplexing is used, usually by
            Middle boxes today, multiple end user sessions share the same TCP
            connection. Today's network troubleshooter often relies upon
            session decryption to tell which packet belongs to which end
            user.
NEW:
            TCP Pipelining/Session Multiplexing used mainly by middle boxes
            today allow for multiple end user sessions to share the same TCP
            connection. Today's network troubleshooter often relies upon
            session decryption to tell which packet belongs to which end
            user as the logs are currently inadequate for the analysis
            needed.

In HTTP Service Call subsection...
OLD:
            It must
            be possible to match up the user request above with the HTTP
            service call below. Today, this is done by decrypting the TLS
            packet and inspecting the payload.
NEW:
            Troubleshooting via network trace involves matching up the user
            request with the HTTP service call. Some organizations do this
            today by decrypting the TLS packet and inspecting the payload.
            Logging has not been adequate for their purposes.

** Again making the leap that logging has not been adequate for their
purposes and the IETF should be able to help with that in HTTP
standards documentation.

**I am finding I need to replace the text in 4.1.3.4 and this will
need to be reviewed by the contributor.

OLD:
   Modern applications often use XML structures in the payload of the
   data to store application level information.  When the network and
   application teams must work together, each has a different view of
   the transaction failure.  It is important to be able to correlate the
   network packet with the actual problem experienced by an application.
NEW:
            Many applications use text formats such as XML to transport
            data or application level information. When transaction failures
            occur and the logs are inadequate to determine the cause, network
            and application teams work together, each having a different
            view of the transaction failure. Using this troubleshooting
            method, the network packet is correlated with the actual problem
            experienced by an application to find a root cause.  The
            inability to access the payload prevents this method of
            troubleshooting.

- removed 'modern' as other formats have taken over.

> - 4.2, 2nd para: A lot of this is duplicative of earlier

1st paragraph - I think the following needs to be tweaked too.
OLD:
        In some cases, alternate options are available when
        encryption is in use, but techniques like that of data leakage
        prevention tools at a proxy would not be possible if encrypted traffic
        can not be intercepted, thus creating a gap and encouraging alternate
        options.
NEW:
        In some cases, alternate options are available when
        encryption is in use, but techniques like that of data leakage
        prevention tools at a proxy would not be possible if encrypted traffic
        can not be intercepted, encouraging alternate options such as
        performing these functions at the edge.
> language and doesn't belong here.

Removed.

> - 5.1: "TLS over SMTP" again a couple of times

Ha. fixed.

> thought there was an ipfix RFC already that'd be good here.

This was DOTS and they haven't published anything yet. I removed the
reference as it hasn't been adopted yet and just referred to the WG as
that will have lots more information in time.

> - 5.6: "has quickly reacted to" is sales language and doesn't

Removed quickly.  Would need to rework the text to change it more.

> about BCP38 but someone forgot to update text written from

RFC2827 is BCP 38, so I don't know what was meant by the [not BCP84].
I am guessing the contributor did want both referenced, but I'll
remove the not BCP84 as that's confusing.

> - 5.7: THe [SACM] reference is odd and has no entry in

I don't think it's odd as it should help.

> - 6.1: Are those "notable exceptions" still relevant? I'd say

Deleted that sentence, thanks.

> suggest you ask an HTTP person maybe. That could also do with

*Will have to come back to this one.
> what's ok/right that are not needed, "being requested" would

I'm deleting the ending clause all together as I think that's clearer
and adding "being requested" isn't the intent.
> managers need" which'd seem out of scope.  I think that needs

Just deleting the first sentence clears this up as the other 2
sentences cover what was intended well enough.

> right phrase. Maybe just "Law enforcement agencies..."

*Hmm, let's come back to this one.  I'm not sure LEA is right as it's
not the same as a government surveillance program.

> - 7: please drop the various uses of "cyber" again;-)
Done. Agreed.

> - 7: David Cameron seems to no longer act in that role.

removed.
> you mean is that technolgoy will be abused by bad actors.

Changed that part of the first paragraph to address a few of your comments:

NEW:
      Governments vary on their
      balance between their need for monitoring versus the protection
      of user privacy, data, and assets. Those that favor unencrypted
      access to data ignore the real need to protect users
      identity, financial transactions and intellectual property, which
      requires security and encryption to prevent crime. A clear
      understanding of technology, encryption, and monitoring needs will aid
      in the development of solutions to appropriately balance the need of
      privacy. As this understanding increases, hopefully the discussions
      will improve and this draft is meant to help further the discussion.
> equally ok and that they all like one another equally. I don't

It's there once now as that is the motivator for many of the
surveillance programs.
> fitted here but I don't have the reference to hand. (Spoiler:

We are open to contributions!

> solve, from the perspective of this document.

I made it less optimistic.  I think if left out, it would become a
talking point that could detract from the purpose of this document.
I'd like it to be clear that this was thought about, but isn't
practical.

> here can be informative and you don't need 2119.

Sure, that makes sense.  It is an informative document.

> content that are easier to use. (The issue here being

*Yes, I'll have to follow up on this one, but have the URLs in the
current version.  Al and I both knew we would have to fix this later
and should have done it prior to AD review.

> e.g. Gentry's PhD or something.

* Yes, I'll find something.
> - 12.2: various references need to be updated. I-D nits will

*Yes, I thin there is just one id left and it's actually in my queue
ahead of this document.
> - 12.2: I'm sure you'll agree that [TOR] isn't right as-is:-)

*Yes, will fix.

Thanks so much for your review.  Anything with a * is one that either
needs my attention, that of a contributor, or my co-author to go back
and look at.

-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen

---

From: Stephen Farrell <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2017 22:00:06 +0000

Hiya,

Mostly grand. A few responses inline. I'd say whack out a
rev whenever you're ready and we can go from there. There
is one remaining thing below I'd like to bottom out before
starting IETF LC which is what to do about section 11 - if
we're keeping it then it needs work - that'd be easy enough
for someone familiar with the mobile n/w stuff (as it's
mostly clarifying or referencing) but a good bit of work
for others maybe.

Other than section 11, any remaining comments of mine should
be fine to be handled as IETF LC comments I figure.

Cheers,
S.

>> done before IETF98 I hope.

For clarity: where I don't respond I'm fine with your response.

> understanding?  Bringing both sides of this together is really the

Perhaps s/In more drastic circumstances/In the limit/ and
s/may be/could be/?

> target="TOR"/> to prevent active attacks on their data streams, which

I still think that's out of context. Maybe mention it elsewhere?

> prefer to leave this as-is.

Still not clear to me that this is correct as stated, but
not a huge deal.

> standards mentioned only.

Problem is, OTR is not a standard, same as the rest. "e.g. OTR" is
maybe the way to do it.

> This was on the content.  Would you prefer to see it reworded/expanded?

Yeah, I think saying prevents is just wrong. Encrypting does
prevent some methods of load-balancing from working but not
all methods. Ditto for other features that get changed. I do
think it's important to not overstate the effects, just as
it is to not understate them.

> the operators views and have them documented as they see it.

I don't think adding the caveats that are needed has anything
to do with respect. When we've been doing a thing one way for
ages, there's a natural tendency to not consider that there
were also other ways to crack the nut;-)

The key point here and in many places is I think to ack that
encryption does affect what has been done to date, and will
force us to find other ways to meet the same goals. But in
most cases, there will be other ways available, which means
that "required" (or "must be known") isn't correct for those
features. (In this case, it could be that any measure that
distinguishes video from other things would be good enough
for many situations for example and that doesn't require
plaintext.)

> break/is breaking and this just acks that point.

Isn't that usually transcoding and not compression?

> *This is from Al (I believe), so I suspect it is backed up from

Consider a request for more info (via ref is fine) as a LC
comment.

> will have to review the discussion.

Most of it was between Tero and Nalini so maybe one of them
can summarise the issues, which were quite relevant for this.
OTOH, that might be too much work to get to text that fairly
covers both aspects (unless there's stuff that can be just
copied from the discussion or the pdm draft).

> game. 

If stepping up their logging game is enough then we agree that
"impossible" is wrong:-)

> Many of the errors could be seen if logs better identified

That's a fine addition, but "impossible" remains incorrect.

>> - 7: David Cameron seems to no longer act in that role.

Cameron certainly was removed:-)

>> - 11.4: MEC needs a reference, see above wrt "trusted proxy"

I guess we need to figure out what to do about section 11.

---

From: Kathleen Moriarty <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2017 21:55:34 -0500

Hi Stephen,

Thanks again, I'll post a new version shortly and may have addressed
some of your comments already, but wasn't clear enough in my response
last time, so I'll try to rectify that and you can take a look at the
uploaded document once I may sure the XML is as expected.  inline.

> For clarity: where I don't respond I'm fine with your response.

Thanks.

>>> really mean "much more common."

Ben Kaduk suggests, "Effects of Pervasive Encryption", which sounds
good to me.  Agreed?

> Perhaps s/In more drastic circumstances/In the limit/ and

I'll change the first to, "in other cases", which should get at your point.
I changed may to could, I don't see any issue with that. Thanks.

> I still think that's out of context. Maybe mention it elsewhere?

I read the proceeding and following sections again and combined the
first sentence of this same paragraph into the previous paragraph.
The point is kinda made already, so I'll let this sentence get
dropped.  That lets us drop the TOR reference too.

> Problem is, OTR is not a standard, same as the rest. "e.g. OTR" is

Right, I was referring to XMPP as the standard in this response.  I
changed to encryption (e.g. OTR) for XMPP.

> it is to not understate them.

OK, how about if the wording is changed to:

      The use of encryption prevents middle boxes from
      performing functions that range from some methods of load
balancing to monitoring for
      attacks or enabling "lawful intercept", such that described in...
> for many situations for example and that doesn't require

I think there will be cases where the goal can't be met.  Things will
change as a result and new solutions will evolve (that may be better),
but the same goal won't always be met.

> Isn't that usually transcoding and not compression?

*We should get the GSMA folks to answer this one.  I could be wrong in
my example, they may have uses if compression where they have not
combined it with encryption in the past that better explain this text.

> Consider a request for more info (via ref is fine) as a LC

*Great.

> copied from the discussion or the pdm draft).

*OK, we'll see if it helps or not.

> That's a fine addition, but "impossible" remains incorrect.

OK, I read it again and changed impossible to difficult.

> I guess we need to figure out what to do about section 11.

*Yes.

>> and should have done it prior to AD review.

*This remains as an outstanding item for the next version.

>>> - 12.2: I'm sure you'll agree that [TOR] isn't right as-is:-)

Can remove it now :-)

-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen