=head1 NAME

auth_krb5 - nnrpd Kerberos v5 authenticator

=head1 SYNOPSIS

B<auth_krb5> [B<-i> I<instance>]

=head1 DESCRIPTION

This program does authentication for B<nnrpd> against a Kerberos v5 KDC.
This is NOT real Kerberos authentication using service tickets; instead, a
username and password is used to attempt to obtain a Kerberos v5 TGT to
confirm that they are valid.  As such, this authenticator assumes that
B<nnrpd> has been given the user's username and password, and therefore is
not as secure as real Kerberos authentication.  It generally should only
be used with NNTP over SSL to protect the password from sniffing.

=head1 OPTIONS

=over 4

=item B<-i> I<instance>

If this option is given, I<instance> will be used as the instance of the
principal received from B<nnrpd> and authentication will be done against
that principal instead of the base principal.  In other words, a principal
like C<user>, when passed to B<auth_krb5> invoked with C<-i nntp>, will be
transformed into C<user/nntp> before attempting Kerberos authentication.

Since giving one's password to B<nnrpd> is not as secure as normal
Kerberos authentication, this option supports a configuration where all
users are given a separate instance just for news authentication with its
own password, so their regular account password isn't exposed via NNTP.

=back

=head1 EXAMPLE

The following readers.conf(5) fragment tells nnrpd to authenticate users
by attempting to obtain Kerberos v5 TGTs for them, appending an instance
of C<nntp> to usernames before doing so:

    auth kerberos {
        auth: "auth_krb5 -i nntp"
    }

    access kerberos {
        users: "*/nntp"
        newsgroups: example.*
    }

Access is granted to the example.* groups for all users who successfully
authenticate.

=head1 BUGS

Currently, any username containing realm information (containing C<@>) is
rejected.  This is to prevent someone from passing in a username
corresponding to a principal in another realm that they have access to and
gaining access to the news server via it.  However, this is also something
that people may wish to do under some circumstances, so there should be a
better way of handling it (such as, perhaps, a list of acceptable realms
or a -r flag specifying the realm in which to attempt authentication).

It's not clear the right thing to do when the username passed in contains
a C</> and B<-i> was also given.  Right now, B<auth_krb5> will create a
malformed Kerberos principal with multiple instances and attempt to
authenticate against it, which will fail but perhaps not with the best
error message.

=head1 HISTORY

Originally written by Christopher P. Lindsey.  This documentation was
written by Russ Allbery <rra@stanford.edu> based on Christopher's original
README file.

$Id: auth_krb5.pod,v 1.1 2002/12/03 03:41:06 rra Exp $

=head1 SEE ALSO

nnrpd(8), readers.conf(5)

The latest version of Christopher's original B<nnrpkrb5auth> may be found
on his web site at L<http://www.mallorn.com/tools/>.

=cut
